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This article lays out why in the context of global crime, crime control and the legitimacy
of global governance, a victim constituency makes sense in terms of the stated aims of in-
ternational criminal justice and of a wider ‘newmorality’ on which it should be grounded.
The incapacity to confront appropriately the consequences to victims of global crime has
tended to mean that international criminal justice and the governance that flows from it
are unsatisfactorily entwined with sectarian international relations and narrow cultural
inclusion. Therefore, in governance terms alone, the conceptualization of global crime
victims should be expanded and emancipated from their current more procedurally re-
stricted standing. As a consequence, the citizenship and standing necessary to enjoy inter-
national criminal justice would be more fairly realized. This article begins by making the
case for why victims should be positioned in a place of priority as the constituency for
international criminal justice. It then moves to demonstrate how, through ‘communities
of justice,’ a sharper victim focus could make international criminal justice more account-
able. This theme runs through the article and links the case for a transformed criminal trial
process to a new age of global governance.
Introduction
Today, in many domestic criminal jurisdictions, the position and voice of the
victim are receiving increased attention and recognition.1 Slowly, it seems that the
prosecution of criminal trials is moving full circle. Historically, in common law
jurisdictions in particular, the prosecution of crimes was the responsibility of the
victim. With the development of the nation-state and the institutionalization and
professionalization of criminal courts, as well as the establishment and monopoly
of police investigation, it has become more realistic for state instruments to take
on the prosecution role. This trend recognizes the interests of the state and the
communities it protects in utilizing crime and punishment as governance tools,2
and has resulted in the marginalization of the victim voice in a way that would not
be tolerated in comparable civil trials.
∗ ProfessorofCriminal Justice, InstituteofCriminology, LawFaculty,Universityof Sydney,Australia.
Email: mark.findlay@usyd.edu.au
1 Bernd Schu¨nemann, ‘The Role of the Victim within the Criminal Justice System: A Three-Tiered
Concept,’ Buffalo Criminal Law Review 3 (1999): 33–49.
2 Jonathan Simon, Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democ-
racy and Created a Culture of Fear (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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More recently, first with victim impact statements and then a range of initiatives
right up to victim advocacy within the trial, the necessity to recognize, consider
and enunciate victim interests in formal trial scenarios have become features
of neoconservative justice reforms.3 Against this, victim advocacy groups have
pushed for a repositioning of trial interests away from the conventional protection
of the accused towards victim compensation.4 The imperative for victim inclusion
has progressed into the procedures governing institutional international criminal
justice.
Those who would like to see the international criminal trial remain a retributive
endeavour that reflects the conventional features and characteristics of domestic
trials argue that to introduce other expectations of the process will endanger its
limited success.5 Some critics posit that the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in particular has achieved legitimacy through the effec-
tive prosecution of significant offenders important to many victim communities.6
In this alone, it is argued, lies justification for the establishment of the International
Criminal Court (ICC).7 Besides these legalist assertions, the ICC and its prosecutor
have claimed more universalist justifications for the Court, pointing to its poten-
tial to assist in state reconstruction and peacemaking. Further, the ICC and the
international tribunals that preceded it have within their authorizing legislation
recognition of victim interests, even if this remains largely outside the processes of
trial decision making.8
Besides highlighting an emergent political utility in balancing victim interests
against the protection of offenders’ rights in national courts, this article argues that
the nature of global crime and the purposes of international criminal justice require
a more victim-centred transformed trial process.9 In saying this, I recognize the
reservations many have about the domestic trend to enunciate victims’ interests
and thereby tomove away from the consequences of the presumption of innocence
towards a more civil jurisdictional consideration of ‘balance.’ There is good reason
3 Raquel Aldana-Pindell, ‘In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Rights to Truth and Justice for
State-Sponsored Crimes,’ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 35 (2002): 1399–1502.
4 Susan J. Brison, Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of Self (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2002).
5 EleanorHannon Judah andMichael Bryant, eds.,Criminal Justice: Retribution vs. Restoration (New
York: Routledge, 2004).
6 Mark Findlay and Clare McLean, ‘Emerging International Criminal Justice,’ Current Issues in
Criminal Justice 18(3) (2007): 457–480.
7 This is not to suggest that the ICC has no concern for restorative, victim-centred considerations.
Such considerations feature in the recent decisions to join victims’ interests with the prosecution
appeals against disclosure, as well as the release of the accused in the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
trial proceedings. See, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, International Criminal Court Appeals
Chamber, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 0A 13 (6 August 2008).
8 For a comprehensive summary of the ICC’s victim obligations, see, Human Rights First, The
Role of the Victim in ICC Proceedings, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international justice/
icc/VICTIMS CHART Final.pdf (accessed 5 April 2009).
9 See, Mark Findlay and Ralph Henham, Transforming International Criminal Justice: Retributive
and Restorative Justice in the Trial Process (Cullompton, UK: Willan, 2005); Mark Findlay and
Ralph Henham, Beyond Punishment: Achieving International Criminal Justice? (Basingstoke, UK:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
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for law reformers and criminal justice professionals to be suspicious of the victims’
lobby when it comes to ensuring a balanced adversarial contest. My argument
is that international criminal justice and the global crimes it confronts present
a uniquely persuasive position for a victim constituency despite the challenging
partiality of victim interests.
The transformed trial, as Ralph Henham and I have envisaged it elsewhere,10
addresses the current failure of formal international criminal justice at three levels:
 Byemphasizing, fromthe victimperspective, access, inclusivity and integration
to key pretrial and trial decision sites;11 and as a result
 Enhancing the legitimate role of victims in creating andmaintaining pathways
of influence out of these crucial trial decision sites; added to which
 Restorative as well as retributive processes will be available within the ‘rights-
protected’ procedures of the trial, enabling victims to better achieve their
legitimate aspirations in the trial context.
In addition to the necessary procedural and legislative enhancement of the trial to
enable structural transformation, the normative foundations of the trial need to
be repositioned along the way. Essential for the success of trial transformation is
an enlivening of juridical discretion so as to manage the smooth achievement of
an improved victim constituency.12
All this must be measured against the crucial importance of accountability as an
indicator of trial fairness and the protections of the accused that these require.13
Despite active efforts by international criminal courts and tribunals to balance
victim interests better during the pretrial and trial phases, the constrictions of
adversarial justice relegate the victim voice to the witness role and compensation
considerations to postsentencing.14
Along with accountability to a victim constituency lies the pragmatic persua-
sion that with heightened victim buy-in to international criminal justice will flow
greater legitimacy for this process across a wider range of the communities it is said
to serve. The legitimacy that the satisfaction of victims’ interests offers should not
be underestimated, or overcalculated. It has already been recognized in theUSwith
the prosecution of those involved in the 9/11 atrocities and other mass killings.15
Prospects for broader systemic legitimation clearly influenced the recent reform
10 Findlay and Henham, 2005, supra n 9.
11 For a detailed modelling of the international criminal trial in terms of sites for decision making
and consequent pathways of influence, see, ibid.
12 I am wrestling with the details of trial transformation, particularly in terms of a ‘developed trial
programme.’ Specifically, the analysis focuses on the repositioning of fact and evidence in the
determination of responsibility, and on a realignment of trial outcomes away from the limits of
penality as the consequence of adversarial argument. See, Findlay and Henham, forthcoming,
supra n 9.
13 Ibid.
14 Mirjan Damaska, ‘What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ Chicago-Kent Law Review
83 (2008): 329–365.
15 Wayne A. Logan, ‘Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age of Terror,’ Georgetown Law Journal
96 (2008): 721–776.
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of criminal procedure laws in jurisdictions such as Italy, Russia, Japan and China,
where victim advocacy is provided for and greater community participation in
criminal justice is advanced. It is not a coincidence that the provisions within the
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence identifying the roles of victims in the pro-
ceedings extend much further than the conventional trial limitations surrounding
the victimwitness.16 The nature and direction of victim legitimation are examined
in this article against a range of challenges that might tend to compromise this
legitimating process.
In other work,17 I have suggested that an incapacity to confront appropriately the
victimization consequences of global crime has tended to mean that international
criminal justice and the governance that flows from it are unsatisfactorily entwined
with sectarian international relations, as well as narrow and politically selective
cultural inclusion.18 Therefore, in governance terms alone, the conceptualization
of global crime victims should be expanded and diversified. As a consequence, the
citizenship and standing necessary to enjoy international criminal justice will be
more fairly realized.
There is no doubt that an ideologically driven campaign to prioritize victim
interests in criminal justice runs the risk of distorting some of the central values
that criminal justice traditions have developed over centuries.19 Mirjan Damaska
goes so far as to say,
In an ideal world, of course, there would be no reason to balance these two aspirations
(accused and victim interests) – they would co-exist in harmony. But in the real world,
painful trade-offs between them must often be made.20
This article’s concluding discussion of ‘communities of justice’ argues for ra-
tionalization above balance. In any criminal justice resolution, several victims
or victim communities with different victim stories may be exercising differ-
ent interests and values. A distillation of legitimate victim interests in such a
contested environment will be a challenge for the transformed criminal trial.
The identification and harmonization of legitimate victim interests are much
more than an uncritical concession to the self-interested expectations, beyond
retributive justice and vengeance, victims enunciate.21 To swing from an accused-
centred to a victim=focused trial fairness paradigm endangers trial legitimacy
if criticism of the former is simply replaced with a new partiality. Legitimacy
16 See, for example, Rule 50 on victim witnesses and Rules 89–91 governing the participation of
victims in the trial process.
17 Mark Findlay, Governing through Globalised Crime: Futures for International Criminal Justice
(Cullompton: Willan, 2008).
18 Mark Findlay, ‘Terrorism and Relative Justice,’ Crime, Law and Social Change 47(1) (2007): 57–68.
19 Logan, supra n 15; Damaska, supra n 14.
20 Damaska, supra n 14 at 333.
21 Hans-Jo¨rg Albrecht, Jan M. Simon, Hassan Rezaei, Holger-Christoph Rohne and Ernesto Kiza,
Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Middle Eastern Societies: Between Tradition and Modernity
(Freiburg: Max Planck Institute, 2006); Ivo Aertsen, Jana Arsovska, Holger-Christoph Rohne,
Marta Valin´as and Kris Vanspauwen, eds., Restoring Justice after Large-Scale Violent Conflicts
(Cullompton: Willan, 2008).
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enhancement comeswith richer communitarian governance through international
criminal justice that the constituency of humanity, rather than sectarian victim
satisfaction, could achieve.22
Communities of justice are presented as the crucial context wherein lay and
professional players will interact so that a more communitarian form of justice
benefits from the application of the rule of law and procedural fairness. As such,
communities of justice become a dynamic environmentwhere negotiation is essen-
tial and where actionable questions are transferred into the trial decision-making
framework, minimizing the burden of partial adversarial argument. It is assumed
that if set up with a common aspiration for justice outcomes, these communities
will make the victim position more reasonable prior to exposure through trial
interrogation.23
This article begins by confronting prevailing circumspection about why victims
should be prioritized as a constituency for international criminal justice. The
argument moves from the demands of legitimacy to the expectation that through
communities of justice, a sharper victim focus will require that international
criminal justice be more accountable. This is a theme that runs through the article
and links the case for a transformed criminal trial process to a new age of global
governance.24 First, however, it is necessary to locate the article’s theoreticalmission
against the perennial struggle between subjective and universalized analysis.
Sociocultural Theorizing of Victimization
Provision of contextual appreciations of sociolegal phenomena like victimization
within different cultures and jurisdictional boundaries is problematic.25 The dif-
ficulties are multiplied when we seek to develop understandings both within and
across jurisdictional boundaries, and particularly for the comparative analysis of
victim communities.
The research balance between phenomenology and social reality (i.e., what
counts as an epistemologically valid explanation) lies in the extent to which agree-
ment exists onwhat constitutes the ‘objectivity’ of victimization.As I suggest below,
with the conditionality of victim legitimacy even the status of victim communities
can be politically and culturally contingent.26 Although the reality of victimization
is epistemologically conjectural, we can nevertheless postulate (depending on our
theoretical persuasion) some a priori principles by which to measure and evaluate
whether such a phenomenon ‘objectively’ exists. The ‘politics’ of victim legitimacy,
I argue below, is constantly engaged in claiming such objectivity. These principles
connect to
 The nature of the harm inflicted;
22 Findlay, supra n 17.
23 Findlay and Henham, forthcoming, supra n 9.
24 See, Findlay, supra n 17.
25 See, Albrecht et al., supra n 21; Aertsen et al., supra n 21.
26 Ibid.
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 The ‘noncombatant’ role; and
 The standing of victim communities against measures of political and cultural
authority.
Also, if victims or victim communities are deemed resistant to these measures, the
consequences of victimization can be markedly different. The subjectivity of the
victim phenomenon is determined largely by measures of ‘innocence’ and hence
concerned with issues such as
 The perceived legitimacy of the causes and consequences of ‘war’;
 What it subjectively ‘feels’ like to be a victim, rather than simply having been
ascribed that status; and
 How these intimate influences have shaped the individual attitudes of those
claiming victimization.
Thus, the social reality of victimization is a conflation of subjective and objective
measures. Victimization, particularly in its communitarian sense, is a represen-
tation of both what ‘victims’ claim and what they have ascribed to their status.
Communitarian victimization especially depends for its legitimacy and credibility
on the consequences that flow from the community’s status and behaviour.
Any social theory that seeks to address the nature and significance of victim-
ization must necessarily address its legal, sociohistorical, economic and political
dimensions. The challenge for comparative analysis (and one largely not met in
many postconflict empirical studies) involves appreciating themultilayered nature
of the relationships between the values and actions that produce victimization
within particular cultures, as well as being able to make epistemologically accept-
able generalizations about them. This article suggests a complex framework of
indicators around which such comparative contextual analysis might be mounted.
Certain ‘war victim’ experience studies that offer vital insights into individual
perception go beyond conventional empirical victim analysis in the sense that they
seek to hypothesize about observed and quantifiable ‘facts,’ such as sentencing
patterns.27 In so doing, the ‘victim experience and aspiration’ approach applies
quantitative techniques to the analysis of what is essentially an account of the
subjective perceptionof ‘facts,’ describingwhat it is like to be a victim in aparticular
postconflict society and how this impacts on the perception of what constitutes
justice for war crimes. The ‘objectivity’ of these accounts can only be evaluated,
in such a subjective methodology, to the extent that we are able to understand
their meaning within particular contexts. These contexts may offer micro- and
macro-cultural ‘objectivities’ outside the comprehension of victim communities
but available for more detached comparative analysis. The comparative potential
of the analysis to follow is more universally generalized through the employment
of community structures and functions of victimization (collective contexts of
experience) to ground the subjective appreciation and ascription of victimization.
27 George P. Fletcher, With Justice for Some: Protecting Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials (Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996).
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The repercussions of this tension between subjective methodologies and objec-
tive speculation are considerable because, both theoretically andmethodologically,
a clear distinction can be drawn between exploring the aspirational and empirical
dimensions of social experience. The objectivity of any social phenomenonmirrors
its subjectivity (and vice versa) – the relationship is reciprocal. We can attempt to
‘explain’ how definitions of objectivity are produced through the analysis of sub-
jective experience, which is a recursive and constantly changing process. Hence,
this approach tries to fix the meaning or contextualize social life by deconstructing
the subjectivity of individual experience and making generalizations about the
extent to which such experiences and understandings are collectively held. Where
the collective experience is given objective form through ‘community,’ it follows
that the comparative enterprise (community to community, and the aspiration to
justice option) is greatly enhanced. Self-evidently, such methodologies are cultur-
ally contextual in suggesting ways in which the objectivity of process is constructed
subjectively.
War victimization, therefore, should be conceived as a social construct that
involves the interplay between the causes and effects of war and the perceived
appropriateness of particular forms of legal and institutional redress. The analy-
sis of postconflict victimization as a comparative endeavour should benefit from
community location so that the individualized and collective representation of
victimization, and its selectivity, can be critiqued and materialized in justice
outcomes.
Why a Victim Focus?
The first answer to this question is simply that international criminal justice has no
choice but to move towards a victim constituency if its legitimacy and functional
relevance are to be confirmed beyond the authority of legislative instruments and
sponsor agencies. It is a functional and operational shift now required by legitimate
victim interests and aspirations for pluralist justice outcomes. In its first trial, the
ICC confronted and – in a limited fashion, through access and representation
decisions in favour of victims – recognized this imperative.
The research carried out in victim communities affected by genocide and crimes
against humanity clearly establishes that victims are not satisfied solely by the
retributive justice offered through current international criminal tribunals.28 This
is not a blanket denial that retributive justice is on the list of victim community
expectations.29 Nor can it be said fromthevictimcommunityperspectives surveyed
that retribution should be marginalized in any process of trial transformation.
Along with most victim communities studied thus far, Henham and I endorse the
importanceof retributive justice in termsof current political resonance for criminal
trials, and against the dissatisfaction of victims ofmass harmwith alternative truth
28 See, for instance, Albrecht et al., supra n 21; Aertsen et al., supra n 21.
29 This concept includes collective victimization, victims’ communities, the victimization of com-
munities and communitarian harm.
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and reconciliation options alone.30 Even the ICC’s capacity for restitution and
compensation through such mechanisms as the Victims Fund may not address
broad restorative concerns.31 If the international criminal trial does not have the
capacity to offer more than retributive justice through international penality, the
potential for victims to justify and legitimate formal international criminal justice
may be squandered.
It has become essential for the legitimacy of international criminal justice that a
victim constituency be centrally recognized. The unavoidable justification for this
rests in the nature of the international criminal jurisdiction. The types of crimes
that international criminal tribunals and courts confront are all inextricably linked
tovictimcommunities.War crimesoccurwithin jurisdictional andcommunitarian
limits. The communities at risk and the individuals, communities and cultures
that suffer harm can be clearly identified. The acts that comprise war crimes
rely on the scope of victimization for their definition. The same could be said of
genocide, although the notion of harm in genocide extends beyond communities
to cultures and races. In fact, in the case of ethnic cleansing, the purpose ofmilitary
intervention and violent confrontation may be to victimize and destroy opposing
cultural or racial elements. Finally, when dealing with crimes against humanity,
it is the global community that is at risk. This community, however defined, is at
least partially a community of potential victims and one for which international
criminal justice is constructed.
Humanity as the Constituency for International Criminal Justice
A new moral foundation for international criminal justice with ‘humanity’ at
its centre32 distinguishes the victim focus for international criminal justice from
current trends to inject a higher victim profile into domestic criminal justice
processes.33 It is different for the following reasons:
 Global crimes are crimes against humanity, against communities and against
culturalism;
 International criminal justice agencies have declared an interest in peacemak-
ing and conflict resolution for the benefit of communities and cultures under
attack;
 The harms against which international criminal justice is directed (war, geno-
cide and ethnic cleansing) are collectivized in their impact; and
 The extent of liability for global crimes is also collectivized beyond consid-
erations of joint criminal enterprise and superior orders, and humanity is a
democratic and inclusive determinant of the global community.
30 Findlay and Henham, 2005, supra n 9.
31 Charles Barton, Restorative Justice: The Empowerment Model (Sydney: Hawkins Press, 2003).
32 Findlay and Henham, forthcoming, supra n 9.
33 This is not to deny such a focus domestically but merely to highlight its dominance in the global
criminal jurisdiction.
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To accept humanity as the natural constituency for international criminal justice
does not require a rejection of ‘the rule of law,’ ‘constitutional legality’ or ‘the global
state’ as important terms of reference for the exercise of that justice. TheUN and its
Security Council, for instance, play a crucial role in the interventions and priorities
of the ICC. In addition, important nongovernmental organizations will continue
to exercise influence in the maintenance of global order. This is as it should be.
The legal professionals in the transformed trial process will play a crucial role in
dividing the rights and protections that the adversarial process can advance.34 With
all this in mind, natural and appropriate constraints on the inclusion of a victim
voice in the trial process may be found, but this does not diminish the importance
of humanity as a constituency for international criminal justice.
Collectivization of the Victim Dimension
I have argued elsewhere that international crime victimization is a collective
phenomenon.35 The term ‘victim community’ recurs throughout this article to
emphasize the manner in which this collectivization occurs. Victim communities
can be seen as a challenging concept to distil, begging the following questions: How
can victimization be removed from individual harm? How are communities (in
their diversity) to be conceived so that some convincing notion of victimization
can emerge? If it does, what are legitimate interests in a community context? How
are these interests to be revealed, and how is a community to be given access to and
voice within criminal justice determinations? What particular impact should the
voices of victim communities be accorded against the conventional protections for
the accused in due process?
The victim dimension is collectivized because of the nature of global victim-
ization and, in the legislative sense, through the way the three global crimes that
form the jurisdiction of the ICC are currently conceived.36 The collectivization of
victims in a global sense from this legislative and jurisdictional foundation invites
the discussion below of collective liability.
The International Criminal Trial’s Failure on Access, Inclusivity
and Integration
As a result of the failure of formal international criminal justice fully to incor-
porate a victim constituency,37 many victim aspirations, such as truth telling,
34 Findlay and Henham, 2005, supra n 9.
35 See, Findlay, supra n 17.
36 Crimes of aggression are to be incorporated along with war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide in 2009 as appropriate for prosecution before the ICC. Consistent with this article’s
argument as relates to the collectivization of victims for existing crime types, crimes of aggression
more often than not are directed against victim communities.
37 This is not an empirical statement, as studies regarding victim inclusion are not yet available. The
assertion rests on the legislative foundations of the courts and tribunals, as well as of several studies,
particularly on victim attitudes to postverdict outreach into victim communities by the ICTY
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See, for instance, Victor Peskin, ‘Courting
Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme,’ Journal of International
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restoration, reconciliation and compensation, have been moved into the alterna-
tive justice paradigm. It is not surprising, therefore, that the mandate for conflict
resolution is more acceptable and less controversial within this alternative frame-
work. Truth commissions have been constructed where postconflict states and
peacekeeping agencies deem that retributive justice and its institutions cannot
legitimately achieve the interests of victims within a context of transition.38 As in-
ternational criminal justice develops and gains more significant purchase in global
governance, it is clear that justice for the purpose of conflict resolution cannot be
relegated to a second tier of truth telling.39
An important justification for transforming the international criminal trial is to
enable victims otherwise relegated to alternative justice contexts to benefit from
the procedural protections offered within the trial, contested as they may be in an
adversarial environment.40 Although these protections are sometimes problematic
in practice, the rights of victims are often more ignored or mediated in local
justice situations. The transformed international criminal trial is premised on
commitments to expanded victim access, deeper and more genuine opportunities
for inclusion and a more natural and productive integration of victim aspirations
through a greater variety of resolution opportunities.41
Need for Conflict Resolution in International Criminal Justice
This discussion of the enhanced governance potential of international crimi-
nal justice concedes the importance of peacekeeping and conflict resolution for
the legitimacy of the process.42 In much of the debate about the contempo-
rary direction of global governance, the importance of state reconstruction is
emphasized.43 It is assumed that after military interventions in transitional states,
community-to-community conflict resolution serves an essential peacemaking
function. Yet, whether through the mechanism of a truth commission or the re-
tributive outcomes of criminal tribunals and special courts, lasting peace will only
emerge when communities of victims are satisfied that governance and justice
Criminal Justice 3(4) (2005): 950–961; Human RightsWatch, Still Waiting: Bringing Justice for War
Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, and Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Cantonal and District
Courts (July 2008). The assertion is also based on the relative underfunding of processes that serve
victim interests at the ICC. See, Jonathan O’Donohue, ‘The 2005 Budget of the International
Criminal Court: Contingency, Insufficient Funding in Key Areas and the Recurring Question of
the Independence of the Prosecutor,’ Leiden Journal of International Law 18 (2005): 591–603.
38 MarkFreeman,TruthCommissions andProcedural Frameworks (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 2006).
39 Findlay and Henham, forthcoming, supra n 9.
40 I do not intend here to overstate trial rights protections. If these rights are retained in their
conventional form, the focus on the accused’s rights in Article 6 the European Convention on
Human Rights offers little comfort to victim participants. A feature of trial transformation as I see
it is the actualization of victim participant protections that do not undermine the accused.
41 Findlay and Henham, 2005, supra n 9.
42 John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002).
43 Findlay, supra n 17; Markus Lederer and PhilippMullers, eds.,Criticising Global Governance (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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interventions on their behalf have meaning and impact. Peacemaking is little more
than political posturing when communities not at war but victimized through war
are excluded fromconstructive justice outcomes. Those institutions andparadigms
of justice most successful in meeting the widest range of victim interests obviously
have greater legitimacy amongst communities that might challenge peace.
Legitimacy of Victim Interests
The legitimacy of justice and governance that emerges from victim satisfaction are
a crucial underpinning of an international criminal justice that conciliates a liberal
democratic governance model. Even with their limited engagement with victim
interests and aspirations, the ICC and international criminal tribunals have been
legislated at least to provide victims with information about the substance and
impact of their determinations. This will never of itself be enough to represent
democratic engagement for an emergent victim constituency. Victim communities
have identified a desire to see the perpetrators of global crime brought to justice.44
In many situations, however, this is a symbolic first stage in addressing more
restorative and community-centred considerations. The ICC has confronted this
pressure as a feature of the emergent tension between the prosecutor’s office and
the Trial Chamber in the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo trial. The interests of the victim
in this case are free from prosecutorial imperatives.
The capacity of victims to demand, and the satisfaction of their legitimate inter-
ests to then legitimate criminal justice service delivery aremore than an ideological
attainment.With international criminal justice institutions identifying conflict res-
olution and peacemaking as central goals, the enjoyment of ongoing peace and
good order should first be measured against the victim communities that have
suffered from the global crimes in question. Where peace is won through further
alienation and exclusion or consequent victimization, legitimacy is undermined.
An obvious problem here is to identify legitimate victim interests in situations
where several victim communities contest the nature of their victimization, its
origins andwhat shouldbedone in restoration.45 Contested victim interests require
procedural opportunities for resolution if the satisfaction of these interests is to
lend legitimacy to international criminal justice.
Victims’ Capacity to Create Global Governance Accountability
In my discussion elsewhere of the two levels of accountability – internal and exter-
nal – offered to international criminal justice through the transformed trial, I have
identified the important context of ‘communities of justice.’46 Communities of
justice in each particular pretrial incarnation provide ‘boundaries of permission’47
44 Albrecht et al., supra n 21.
45 Findlay and Henham, forthcoming, supra n 9.
46 Findlay, supra n 17.
47 Mark Findlay, ‘The Ambiguity of Accountability: Deaths in Custody and Regulation of Police
Power,’ Current Issues in Criminal Justice 6(2) (1994): 234–251.
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to determine the nature of justice applied and justified for the conflicts and chal-
lenges these communities are facing. The processes of justice employed, the deci-
sion making they achieve and the outcomes and resolutions they elicit will be the
measures of accountability against genuine communitarian justice aspirations.
The location of justice accountability within communities takes it away from
its present, and I would argue unhealthy, reliance on the sponsorship of sectarian
political hegemony. This is not to say that international criminal justice account-
ability will not have its political dimension. Rather, a more productive place for the
political aspect of accountability is grounded in the authority that communitarian
justice interests and processes provide.
The Nature of the Global Victim
Once the need for greater attention to a victim constituency in international
criminal justice has been argued, the next issue is to identify and describe in more
detail the nature of the global victim. Collectivization aside, the global victim
has some unique features in terms of inclusion and exclusion that mean that
victim status is not simply designated by proximity to violent harm. Even so, the
harm arising from violent exchanges that is borne by victims remains a critical
determinant of victimization in domestic criminal justice settings. Globally, the
relativity and sectoral designation of violence that a the interest of international
criminal justice mean that harm to victims and communities of victims may not
be enough to ascribe legitimate victim status to them.48
Problems Caused by Victor’s Justice
‘Victor’s justice’ suggests the discrimination and exclusion initiating international
criminal justice through a process of criminalization that in the current phase of
globalization is inextricably linked to sectarian political hegemony.49 In terms of
victimization, victor’s justice is responsible for the designation of those victims
worthy of protection, imbued with the rights of citizenship and therefore standing
before formal justice institutions. The flip side of this is the denial of legitimate vic-
tim status to those individuals and communities that resist the cultural, economic
and political predominance of the hegemony.
Essential for distinguishing those victims worthy of justice outcomes from those
who are not is the attribution of morality or immorality to violence applied by
and against particular groups. Morality in this sense relies in part on awarding
the status of innocents to some victims and perpetrators or, at the very least, the
status of justified collaborators. Concepts of risk, powerlessness, guilt, injury and
blame are empowered where they are applied on behalf of the innocent victim to
48 Findlay, supra n 17.
49 Ibid.
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those represented asunjustifiedperpetrators. For example, terrorist communities50
become victims in similar contexts to those who suffer terrorist violence, but from
the perspective of victor’s justice, little regard is paid to their victimization as a
supposed necessary consequence of justice against terror.
Therefore, the subjective distinction of worthy victimization depends on the
authority of those imposing the label and the ‘significant others’ on whom the
label rests. The process of ‘meaning attribution’ is not all one-way traffic, however.
For any meaning to stick, it must resonate for the wider audience at which it is
directed. The valorized victim may retain the status accorded by our politicized
process ofmeaning, amongst those significant others (family, friends, civic leaders,
etc.) who accept the authority of the labelling agency and its ‘take’ on the terror
enterprise. Crucial to this process are the victims themselves. Those who might
challenge or even modify the nature of this meaning and its authority are quickly
sidelined and their valorization is denied.
The morality of the justice response (or the terrorist act, for that matter) re-
quires either community respect or superimposed violence (force) to condition
its standing and ensure compliance. If the claim for standing relies on force rather
than respect, the resistance of the recipient communities is an important consid-
eration in fashioning the response and expectations of its effectiveness. If standing
is to have an essential influence on the prosecution, beyond a particular version of
truth or justice, the arena within which it is claimed must be mutually respected.
Particularly at this level, the morality of victor’s justice is contested by terrorist
violence.
The Challenge of Jurisdiction and Standing Posed by Selective
Citizenship
Standing, even in the legal, nonmetaphysical sense, has largely eluded analysis in
the literature on international criminal justice and global governance. A reason
for this is that if standing is to have a definitive influence on the prosecution
of a particular version of truth or justice, the context within which it is claimed
must be mutually respected. The selective application of international criminal
justice currently runs against such mutuality of interest.51 Particularly at the level
of the morality of victor’s justice, it is constantly contested through the violence of
resistant communities.
The ambiguity of violence as both a challenge to and a confirmation of hege-
monic domination is widely apparent in the process of redefining statehood and
citizenship on the ‘global periphery.’52 Here, in transitional and separatist states,
50 These are not to be understood as communities of terrorists – far from it. Rather, they are
communities for which the terrorist claims representative significance and which may share
common ideologies but not necessarily common commitments to violence.
51 Findlay, supra n 18.
52 Citizenship here is not merely referring to some as yet amorphous claim to inclusion in the ‘global
community.’More particularly, it represents claims to legitimacy and standingwithin the sectarian
protection of hegemonic global governance. See, Findlay, supra n 17.
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violence is transacted from the status of terrorist coercion through to legitimate
armed struggle, along with the transformation to legitimacy and global recog-
nition. In the context of the ‘war on terror,’ crime victimization and legitimate
claims to global citizenship are conflated. The fissures of exclusion and inclusion
are drawn against criminality and the victimization of global communities.
Citizenship is protected through globalization where it accords with the con-
structs of the global community and its market economies, liberal democracies,
democratic styles of government and allegiance to the modernization project.53
The nature and ramifications of global citizenship are clearer in the context of
international criminal justice than they may be in other regulatory frameworks
because of the triggering effect of citizenship.
Humanity is represented and protected by prosecutions before international
criminal tribunals. The global community, through the enabling legislation of the
ICCand international tribunals, carries actionable responsibility for a limited range
of harms caused to communitieswithin it. In this regard, it is not simply individuals
or nation-states that are the subject of tribunal interest; in fact, under the terms of
the ICC Statute, individual liability is the focus of the justice delivered.54
The challengewhen conceptualizing and actualizing global citizenship is to avoid
the political partiality demonstrated in global governance as it presently operates.
From the regulatory perspective of the dominant political alliance, domestic cit-
izens are cherished if they fall within the political allegiance and jurisdictional
boundaries of the alliance and its supporter states. Outside these boundaries, the
protection of the nation-state and citizenship are conditional on risk and security
evaluations from the perspective of the dominant alliance and on broader geopo-
litical significance. These considerations also invest the designation of legitimate
victim.
Victims in Both Supportive and Resistant Communities
Resistance to the partial recognition of citizenship is sometimes violent within
communities where individual rights are subservient to communitarian concerns
of social harmony.55 Western governance models, which promote individual au-
tonomy over community responsibility, have not received universal acceptance
through globalization, and this has fomented violent resistance in some contexts.
Margaret Levi argues that citizens are more likely to comply with and give active
consent to imposed democratic governance when its institutions and processes are
perceived as fair in decisionmaking and implementation.56 The cultural sensitivity
53 Mark Findlay, The Globalisation of Crime: Understanding Transitional Relationships in Context
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Zygmunt Bauman, Globalisation: The Human
Consequences (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).
54 For a critique of this position against the need to collectivize liability, see, Alison Danner and
Jenny Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and
the Development of International Criminal Law,’ California Law Review 93 (2005): 75–169.
55 Findlay, supra n 18; Braithwaite, supra n 42.
56 Margaret Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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and origination of these processes are also crucial to its acceptance.57 Inclusivity
and community collaboration affect acceptance of imposed governance models.
The same could be said about the response to international criminal justice as
an introduced governance model in which community justice is not primarily
individualized.
When citizenship is more dependent on the jurisdiction of the secular state than
on membership of a religious culture or a cohesive community, issues such as
territoriality, sovereignty and political authority are determined to be central risk
and security considerations by the dominant alliance. Communities that value
religious culture and communitarian customary practices are overrepresented
amongst those victimized by violence internationally, but through their resistance
to the dominant political alliance, they have been denied legitimate victim status.
Collectivity and Distance: Who Can Claim Victimization?
Issues of standing for ‘victims’ seeking international criminal justice highlight a
clear tension between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ contexts of justice service delivery.
The criminal justice literature is replete with caveats concerning the uncritical
expansion of victim participation and influence in domestic trial deliberations.58
Internationally, however, the ICC and tribunals have advanced victim interests
through a range of pretrial and trial inclusions. This is a logical consequence of the
special position of victim communities in the construction of global criminality.
Further, the collective and communitarian contexts of global criminal victimiza-
tion defuse much of the domestic debate about distance, harm and legitimacy.
The experience in domestic jurisdictions of trying to identify an appropriate vic-
tim voice in homicide trials has raised the specific question of victimization and the
actionable distance from the harm caused by the substantive crime (original victim
encounter). Courts have faced some difficulty in situations where the immediate
victim is the deceased in determining to what extent family and friends intimately
connected to but removed from the victimization can be considered victims for the
purposes of an impact statement. The conundrum of victim status and distance
from harm is likely to be moderated within global crimes like genocide, where the
victimmay be perceived as a community, a culture or a race as much as individuals
who have suffered directly from the crime.
In the situationofmassmurder trials,WayneLogan explores themanydifficulties
the use of victim statements presents, including:
 Demarking permissible boundaries in terms of victimization and impact.
These are issues for capital (murder) trials in general, but they may be ex-
acerbated in the context of mass killings and mass victimization.
 Questions of proximity to the actual victimization for survivors.
57 Findlay, supra n 53.
58 See, for example, Fletcher, supra n 27; Edna Erez and Linda Rogers, ‘Victim Impact Statements
and Sentencing Outcomes and Processes: The Perspectives of Legal Professionals,’ British Journal
of Criminology 39(2) (1999): 216–239.
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 The forms of harm to be recognized by the court.
 Guarding against popular emotionalism, which may affect the personal expe-
riences of victim survivors.
 A range of tactical problems in giving equal recognition or proportional weight
to different victim voices, depending on proximity, and how these are to be
challenged.59
For instance, the instrumentality of victim impact statements arising from terror-
ist mass killings is controversial. Should the victim voice, individual or collective,
influence sentencing directly? If so, what weight should be accorded relative to
other sentencing principles, such as general community protection? Further, in
the context of widely feared terrorist attacks, how can the interests of the accused
fairly be separated from victim impact, as well as community vengeance or mob
hysteria? In terms of extending the reach of legitimate status, what are the dan-
gers for international criminal justice in preferring victims’ interests and thereby
compromising conventional protections for the accused?
The problems associated with this trend have been rehearsed in detail in the case
of domestic jurisdiction of victim impact statements in homicide.60 Therein, no
victim voice remains, beyond the voices of secondary parties closely connected
to the deceased. This issue of connection to harm is exacerbated when more
than one voice comprises a connected victim community. Moving up to a global
context, communitarian victim contexts presuppose more flexible and case-by-
case consideration of harm ‘networking.’ After all, this is the essence of genocide.
In the international context, the normative framework around harm and victim
location may not be as consolidated as it can be in the domestic setting. According
to Logan,
While the views of natures and cultures can coalesce in matters of broad importance
. . . they often diverge on questions relating to more specific normative notions of
substantive andprocedural fairness . . .Finally is thebasic questionwhether government
should be appointed to deploy victims to meet their didactic ends?61
Victim Communities
Crucial to my argument in favour of repositioning the constituency of interna-
tional criminal justice towards legitimate victims’ interests is the recognition of
communitarian victimization. Communitarian incorporation assumes a level of
participatory democracy not yet seen in global governance. Communitarian gov-
ernance will give legitimacy to both the substantive and the institutional authority
of global governance so far not present beyond normative claims about themes
like rights and justice.62
59 Logan, supra n 15.
60 Erez and Rogers, supra n 58.
61 Logan, supra n 15 at 741.
62 Braithwaite, supra n 42.
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I have strategically employed the notion of ‘victim communities’ not only to
emphasize the collective composition of global victimization but also to identify
the structures of relationships that make sense of global crime victimization and
that would be essential in the measure of appropriate restorative and reconcilia-
tory responses.63 The article now further develops the concept of communitarian
victimization in discussing communities of justice. Essential to this discussion is
the recognition that victim communities themselves may be in contest over the
nature and legitimacy of victimization. This will be one of the principal challenges
for legal professionals in the transformed international criminal trial process.
On to the requirement of identifying victim communities in action, the com-
munitarian context of victimization engages:
 The communities of victims, which share their harm;
 Wider communities or groups of victims that suffer harm;
 Crime directed at community cohesion or cultural integrity; and
 Violencemotivated by the destruction of what makes communities or cultures
(language, art, religion, family structure, etc.).
The Nature of Global Crime and the Centrality of ‘Mass Violence’
Crimes against humanity, genocide andwar crimes all have about them andwithin
them collective composition. Global crime, therefore, assumes the importance
of communities that comprise the ‘humanity’ that international criminal justice
should prosecute and protect in a normative and a practical sense.
As with victim valorization, ‘humanity’ has been limited as a consequence of
the segregation of legitimate violence. Oppositional cultures and communities,
if resisting in a violent fashion the governance of the dominant political alliance
worldwide, become the subject of criminal prosecution rather than being appreci-
ated in any context of victimization. Segregated cultures, therefore, are disengaged
from the protections of international criminal justice through association with
perpetrators rather than victims. Consequently, the communitarian notion of
global victimization is selective, exclusive and discriminatory. Victimization is not
accorded as a result of violent harm alone. Violence is negotiated in terms of its
legitimacy rather than its consequences.64
Aggressively resistant victim communities against whomviolence is directed also
resort to themonopolist claims over legitimate violence exhibited in compromised
global governance.65 For instance, suicide bombers give meaning to their sacrifice
(and that of their innocent victims) in terms of the discriminatory violence of
oppressive cultures against which they are at war. These oppressive cultures may
63 Findlay, supra n 17.
64 Findlay, supra n 18.
65 This balancing of aggressive justice responses with violent victim reaction is not essentially causal
or universal. Violent justice can be directed against otherwise peaceful resistant communities,
and it is not the principal cause of terrorist resistance. However, in certain prominent examples
of violent justice and resistance, the relationship merits examination as much as the social and
cultural factors acting against violent resistance.
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not be within the suicide bombers’ middle-class, detached personal experience
but they are no less ‘real’ as a motivation for violent resistance. The monopoly on
violence exists in terms of contested legitimacy and not merely the nature of its
occurrence. Even victimization cannot alone determine the legitimacy or otherwise
of violence.
Violence may be a force for transition, but rarely can it sustain legitimate gov-
ernance, domestic or global. Whether employed by resistance movements or the
arms of the state against which these movements are directed, violent revolution
may stimulate transition, but it will not ground the governability of cultures in
conflict, as the Palestinian Authority recently demonstrated. Even so, violence is
all too often an essential precursor to more established styles of global governance.
Walter Benjamin sees legitimacy, or violently asserted legitimacy, prevailing over
contested political realities as the key to the ‘legal ends’ of violence. In this respect,
violent responses from states in transition (such as Sri Lanka, in conflict with the
Tamil Tigers) demonstrate a violent-response governance model against violent
revolution that the state criminalizes. Militarist violence claims its legality through
the authority of the state but does not have legality as its principal end.66
Benjamin calls the first function of violence the ‘law-making function’ and the
second the ‘law-preserving function.’ Violence in the context of legality and justice
responses for the sake of longstanding legitimacy would replace militarism,67 as
the US problematically claims it will in the restoration of Iraq to democratic
governance. When governance itself is challenged as a result of a sectarian and
arguably unjust or illegal application to some victim communities and not others,
the limitation of violence as a regulatory capacity becomes clear.68
The Nature of Global Violence: Conflict against States or
Distinguishing Communities?
Violence becomes a tool for social exclusion against communities and cultures de-
termined to live beyond and outside the realm of legitimate victimization. When
these communities and cultures become ‘collateral damage’ throughmilitary inter-
vention or violent justice responses, the violence directed against them is deemed
suitable for prosecution in international criminal courts, as demonstrated by the
experience of the ICTY.
In the setting of global governance, I discussed in detail the nature and conse-
quences of violent regulatory responses in the form of military intervention or
formal and sometimes distorted justice incursions.69 There can be little doubt
that the perceived danger of international terror has given the US and its global
66 Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence,’ in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writ-
ings, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), as noted in Marcus Bullock and
Michael W. Jennings, eds., Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913–1926 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
67 Ibid.
68 Hanah Arendt, On Violence (London: Allen Lane, 1969).
69 Findlay, supra n 18.
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political alliance the opportunity to expand justifications for military interven-
tion and to augment traditional justice forms in order to segregate, contain and
punish terrorist suspects.70 A recurrent concern in international criminal justice,
which distinguishes its scope from domestic criminal justice traditions, is conflict
resolution in transitional state violence. In fact, this objective could be refined to
more universal domestic applications of the criminal sanction to maintain social
order. The ‘global community,’ which enjoys social order within the restored state
and against cultural resistance, comprises only those victims ‘worthy’ of justice
protection. With the other ‘victims and their communities,’ global governance is
often at war.
War-Based Governance
Traditional criminal justice protections and even international human rights con-
ventions can be argued away by identifying the principal threats to global security
and world order in terms of war and war making. Like victim valorization, the
war discourse promotes a clear if questionable division between citizens who de-
serve the protections of international criminal justice and the enemies who do
not. On this basis, international criminal justice is coopted into the war analogy,
and even conventional justice protections are selectively employed through con-
ditional citizenship. As for parajustice, discrimination and its consequences for
further selective victimization are starker.
The war discourse and its consequences for the purposes of social control as
governance are not new. Jonathan Simon rightly draws our attention to the war
on drugs, and even to the war on cancer, as policies designed to galvanize and
sharpen control on regulatory potential.71 What makes this new phase of the war
on terror interesting in termsof both governance andvictimization is themanner in
which it has justifiedmilitary intervention and distortion of conventional criminal
justice when applied to terrorists. War discourse is no novelty as a language of
international crime control. Whether it is a war on drugs, a war on vice or a war on
child abuse, the conflictual discourse resounds through the political representation
of law enforcement as military engagement. What distinguishes the war on terror
discourse from, say, one that relates to the war on drugs is its justification of actual
and extensive military interventions. This state of war is more universalized.
The preference in global governance terms for ‘law over war’ in controlling
international crimes such as terrorism may gain greater relevance as international
humanitarian law plays a more important role in international criminal justice.72
Modern laws of war evolved in the 19th century from reciprocal alliance pacts that
were designed to ensure minimal restraint amongst civilized people. Any strict
contractual approach to mutuality in restraint has been superseded in the current
70 For a discussion of the consequences of the war on terror discourse, see, Gerard P. Fogarty, ‘Is
Guantanamo Bay Undermining the Global War on Terror?’ Parameters 35(3) (2005): 54–72.
71 Simon, supra n 2.
72 Elizabeth Chadwick, ‘It’s War, Jim, but Not as We Know It: A “Reality Check” for International
Laws of War?’ Crime, Law and Social Change 39(3) (2003): 233–262.
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situation of global governance by a more rigid and delineated commitment to
global security and order at whatever cost. The cost has emerged as violence to the
rights of the offender and victims in the name of risk alleviation and other security
concerns.
The violence focus of governance responses to global terror can be seen as harm-
ing the rights of offenders and communities as much as their physical integrity.
Christopher Michaelson argues that criminal law has been ‘bastardised’ in the
name of control and security.73 The perversion of human rights in the process is
evidence that both law and justice have been subverted. The question iswhether the
terrorist threat can be viewed legally as a sufficient public emergency that national
security legislation is justified in abrogating the common obligations imposed by
international human rights conventions.
Cultural Victimization
Terrorist communities worldwide are clearly delineated in terms of their ideologies
and their political commitments. For instance, fundamentalist Islamist predispo-
sitions now are seen as a crucial stimulant to terrorist activities. Almost as in the
time of the Crusades, Islamic culture has become the enemy of liberal democracy
and western freedoms, leading to the wholesale alienation ofMuslim communities
in the West, in particular.
Amongst other cultures facing simplistic terrorist designations, political sepa-
ratists may be given legitimate victim status along with credibility in geopolitically
valued states. ‘Terrorist’ communities are denied the political legitimacy of rational
resistance, whichmeans that violence against these communities is legitimated and
the resultant harm is neutralized. Take for example the worldwide condemnation
of theTamil Tigers and their long-standing violent resistance to the Sri Lankan state
authorities. In the case of the East Timorese opposition to Indonesian annexation,
meanwhile, the world slowly came to view this resistance as a legitimate struggle
for self-determination and cultural identity.74 Some might say it is an interesting
coincidence that Indonesia is the largest of the world’s Islamic nation-states, while
Sri Lanka is seen as a bulwark against the socialist governance of Tamil Nadu.
The social exclusion of whole cultures beyond claims of legitimate global citi-
zenship and resultant actionable victimization provide fertile ground for violent
resistance to global governance. The devaluation of the critical components of any
culture, along with violent justice responses to terrorist resistance, undermines
the capacity of global governance to develop a pluralist and inclusive regulatory
framework. Violence breeds violencewhen cultural integrity, as well as community
safety, is at stake.
73 Christopher Michaelson, ‘International Human Rights on Trial: The United Kingdom’s and
Australia’s Response to 9/11,’ Sydney Law Review 25(3) (2003).
74 Suzannah Linton, ‘New Approaches to International Justice in Cambodia and East Timor,’ Inter-
national Review of the Red Cross 845 (2002): 93–119.
International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 183–206
Activating a Victim Constituency in International Criminal Justice 203
Hegemonic Violence and Sectarian Exclusion
The dominant global political alliance, which has assumed a crusading role in
the war on terror, has consciously sponsored and promoted the emergence of
violent control strategies, as well as their delineation.75 Coalescing this alliance is
a hegemony of ideals, preferred governance models, singular economic relations
and cultural supremacy. Yet, this hegemony is fragile when both confirmed and
challenged through terror and violent resistance. The formation and reformation
of hegemonic orders in the context of wars of any type offer disproportionate and
dangerous precedents to violence in challenging or confirming order. Hegemony
over the war on terror is no different.
A characteristic of political hegemonies that struggle to determine and impose
a singular cultural and economic order over a wide and expanding terrain is that
violence becomes dominant in control strategies. Violence uniformly produces vic-
timization.Where violence and victimization become instrumental in determining
the limits of political hegemony and the nature and illegitimacy of resistance to
it, social exclusion in a community and in a cultural sense is a feature of that
order.76
Constructive political configurations are less possible or sustainable where op-
positional forces are determined through violent risks and counteredwith violence
rather than diplomacy. The security of a hegemonic order becomes the overriding
aspiration where order is contested and violence is the language of dominion. At
base, global hegemony is presently a political construct. As Jo¨rg Friedrichs ob-
serves, in order to provide the glue for global capitalism and an ordered global
community, global governance is sometimes construed as beyond and somehow
above politics.77 That said, violence and victimization, which confirm and confine
the world order, have recently exacerbated violent resistance through sectarian
exclusion of communities and cultures from that order.78
Communities of Justice: Making a Victim Focus Work
Communities of justice are, in essence, a meeting of principal stakeholders in
international criminal justice; a context wherein legitimate interests can be sorted
out and features in dispute narrowed down with the assistance and oversight of
legal professionals and the protections of a trial justice tradition.79 Returning tomy
initial discussion of identifying and rationalizing victim interests as the dominant
75 Hans-Jo¨rg Albrecht and Martin Kilchling, Victims of Terrorism Policies and Legislation in Europe:
An Overview of Victim Related Assistance and Support (Freiburg, Germany: Max Planck Institute,
2005).
76 FinnTschudi, ‘DealingwithViolentConflict andMassVictimisation:AHumanDignityApproach,’
in Aertsen et al., supra n 21.
77 Jo¨rg Friedrichs, ‘Global Governance and the Hegemonic Project of Transatlantic Civil Society,’ in
Lederer and Muller, supra n 43.
78 Jonathan Kay, ‘Redefining the Terrorist,’ National Interest 75 (2004): 87–93.
79 The concept is explored in the context of democratic global governance in Findlay, supra n 17.
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commitment of international criminal justice, I suggest that communities of justice
will comprise:
 Contesting victim interests and their ‘voices’;
 Perpetrators and accused persons against whom victimization responsibility
is charged; and
 Juridical professionals required tomanage andmediate justice resolutions and
decision pathways to specific trial outcomes, governed by the rule of law and
procedural fairness.
Because of limited access to the trial process, pretrial communities of justice will
function in an important didactic role for other communitarian justice oppor-
tunities in the less formal or alternative justice sector of international criminal
justice.
Communities of justice are more than just a place for negotiating particular or
mutual interests. They are essentially communitarian in nature, intent, discourse
and diversity. As true communities, they coalesce with an eventual common pur-
pose: the achievement of humanitarian justice. It is anticipated that if the con-
ditions for communitarian justice are ensured,80 trust and mutual respect being
essential to them, then a shared notion of humanity may override the tensions of
self-interest in the trial proper. This outcome will eventuate within communities
of justice provided that the rewards available through trial access, inclusivity and
integration are observed and actual.81
It would be naı¨ve not to identify and confront the very different starting points
for stakeholders on the road to a possible justice communion within the context
of the international criminal trial. Therefore, the mechanisms we have proposed
for the achievement of that identification and its mediation will be crucial before
a trial for establishing a possible and appropriate common framework through
which communities of justice will evolve and engage with particularized issues in
dispute for adversarial resolution in the trial.
As with the trial model, as a series of crucial decision sites where ‘pathways of
influence’ are constructed by crucial stakeholders (victims included),82 commu-
nities of justice will centre on decision sites essential for the identification and
achievement of justice outcomes. Pretrial and trial contexts will enable the media-
tion of disputes that otherwise would complicate and confound the decisions that
emerge progressively in this model. These decision sites also will be influential in
the type of communitarian justice resulting from the various regulatory mecha-
nisms resorted to by any community of justice to solve its justice requirements.
80 These conditions are developed in detail in Findlay and Henham, forthcoming, supra n 9. Put
simply, communities of justice in a trial attachment will be determined through pretrial confer-
encing in a mediation format. It will be similar in process to the way agreed facts are settled prior
to trial. The prosecutor (and, where necessary, victim advocates) will mediate conflicting interests
so that commonality can be passed on to the trial proper and the key issues in dispute can progress
to adversary resolution within the trial.
81 Ibid.
82 Findlay and Henham, 2005, supra n 9.
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Outside the trial, for instance, the crucial process of victim compensation in the
ICC framework would be significantly affected and facilitated by the mediation of
victims’ interests through communities of justice resolutions (pretrial and trial).
This process assumes that in a community of justice, a singular regulatory model
is in appropriate and that a variety of regulatory alternatives should be on offer for
negotiation and resort, even in the trial itself.83
A detailed contextual interrogation of how any particular community of justice
reaches consensus also requires getting to know the parties and relationships from
which pathways of influence to crucial decisions in the trial may evolve. In order
that such an interrogation be valuable and predictive, the obligations of trial
professionals to facilitate communities of justice need to be clearly designated and
uniformly required.84
Communities of Justice and Accountability
In addition to providing the framework for more conciliatory justice resolutions
respectful of legitimate victims’ interests, communities of justice will act essentially
as abackground for testing the accountability of international criminal justice.How
does a community of justice promote international justice as an accountability
pillar in global governance?85
 Aswith all communities, it provides ‘boundaries of permission’86 withinwhich
discretion can be exercised and decisions have their acceptable reach.
 Theseboundaries arequalifiedby the samenormative framework that confirms
the justice for which the community strives.
 For this justice to be confirmed and to continue, it must have legitimacy within
the community.
 This legitimacy is crucially dependant on an atmosphere of peace and order
that global governance is charged with ensuring.
 The capacity of global governance to achieve peace and good order and to
maintain their benefits relies on thewidest support of the cultures and interests
that contest in any community of justice.
 Therefore, good governance is only achieved when the instrumentalities and
processes of governance are responsible to the legitimate interests within those
communities.
Communities of Justice and Legitimation: The Future of
International Criminal Justice?
Concluding the analysis in Governing through Globalised Crime is the recogni-
tion that communitarian justice has powerful potential to legitimate international
83 Findlay and Henham, forthcoming, supra n 9.
84 Ibid.
85 For a more detailed answer than space here allows, see, Findlay, supra n 17.
86 Elaborated on in Findlay, supra n 47.
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criminal justice and the governancemodel within which it is significantly placed.87
For such legitimacy to be more than superficial, communities in dispute need at
least to share a common regard for the reconciliatory capacity of international
criminal justice, its institutions and its agencies.
The achievement of a resounding and resilient legitimacy that is community
focused takes us back to a consideration of the normative framework for a
transformed international criminal justice and the manner in which it is to be
actualized.88 Access to justice is central to this achievement. It needs to be much
more inclusive than is possible for victims’ interests in contemporary domestic
criminal justice models. Inclusivity means more than appearance, and it functions
much better as actual involvement.89 To confirm the reality of access, along with
inclusivity comes the need for integration at all stages of the pretrial and trial
decision-making process. If this is achieved, victim interests should be recogniz-
able in each important pathway of influence at any pretrial and trial decision site
within the transformed trial process.
Communities of justice will not be achieved simply by a loose recognition of a
new normative framework around access, inclusivity and integration. The reality
of communitarian justice for international criminal justice within trials will rely
on if and how justice professionals, prosecutors and judges, in particular, engage
with and promote the victim voice, as well as confront and confound the challenges
that enabling a victim voice constantly presents.90
87 For a detailed discussion of this governance model, see, ibid.
88 See, Findlay and Henham, 2005, supra n 9.
89 For adiscussionof the limitsof that involvement in the courts and tribunals as currently constituted,
see, Holger-Christoph Rohne, The Victims and Witnesses Section at the ICTY: An Interview with
Wendy Lobwein (Freiburg, Germany: Max Planck Institute, 2003).
90 Tyrone Kirchengast, The Victim in Criminal Law and Justice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006).
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